Discourse analysis by Chouliaraki, Lilie
  
Lilie Chouliaraki
Discourse analysis 
 
Book section 
 
 
Original citation: 
Originally published in Bennett, T; Frow, J. (eds.), The SAGE handbook of cultural analysis.  
London, UK : SAGE Publications, 2008, pp. 674-698. 
 
© 2008 Lilie Chouliaraki 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21564/
 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2010 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Discourse Analysis, to begin with a claim of broad consensus,  
poses the question of how to analyse culture not as a question of 
behavioural variables or objective social structures, but as a question of 
understanding culture ‘from within’ and it provides the cultural analyst 
with a concrete object of investigation- the text. Its premises draw upon 
Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ and upon Foucault’s theory of 
‘discourse’, both of which view language as a constitutive component  
of the social world.  
Culture is constituted by the resources of meaning-making,  
language and image, which are available for use in a community of social 
actors at any given time. Historically specific and locally variable as these 
symbolic resources of meaning-making are, they always function to 
crystallise and to change social beliefs, relationships and identities in the 
form of texts. The term discourse refers precisely to the capacity of 
meaning-making resources to constitute social reality, forms of 
knowledge and identity within specific social contexts and power 
relations (Hall 1997: 220). In claiming that texts are multiply implicated 
in their social contexts and, thereby, come to shape various forms of 
knowledge and identity, Discourse Analysis has been instrumental in 
developing a more dynamic and historically-sensitive mode of critical 
inquiry into culture- what is broadly known as post-structuralism.  
 In this context, it is important to emphasise that behind the post-
structuralist analysis of discourse lies a Saussurian theory of language as 
a meaning-making system that is organised around relationships of 
opposition and combination. For Saussure, meaning comes about from 
the possibility of linguistic signs to be different from one another and yet 
to complement each other in intelligible relationships within the system 
of language. At the same time, post-structuralism goes beyond Saussure’s 
theory of language to argue that these relationships of meaning-making 
are not purely systemic, that is appertaining to the language structure 
itself, but also social- having their ‘conditions of possibility’ in the 
historical and political relationships in which they are embedded. In 
Foucault’s terminology, linguistic relations appertain to particular 
systems of ‘power/knowledge relations’ specific to their historical 
juncture (1977:27).  
In this sense, the Foucauldian concept of discourse sets up a  
constitutive relationship between meaning and power in social practice. 
Every move to meaning-making comes about from a position of power- 
power both structuring and structured by the social positions available 
within the practice. And every move to meaning-making makes a claim to 
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truth precisely from that power position that enunciates it; this is not the 
truth but always a truth effect, a truth that seeks to re-constitute and re-
establish power through meaningi.  
Foucault does not, however, postulate that meaning and power  
pre-exist in an inseparable state as causal conditions of existence for 
social practice- as ontological a prioris of the social world. What he 
claims, rather, is that meaning and power are always already encountered 
in complex grids of co-articulation within every social practice – they are 
the historical a prioris of the social world. He therefore prefers to 
consider meaning and power as analytical dimensions of the social, which 
can be subject to systematic study in terms of their historical conditions 
of emergence and their effects upon social subjects. It is these effects of 
subjectification, whereby discourse calls into being forms of social 
identity at the moment that it simply claims to represent them, which 
have been the focus of Foucault’ s discourse analysis (Foucault 1982: 
208).  
Even though, as Detel says (2005: 6-36), the common view  
is to classify Foucault’s analytical work into separate categories or 
periods- for example, with discourse analysis taking place in the 
framework of an archaeology of knowledge, and the analysis of power in 
the framework of genealogy and in the study of ethical techniques of the 
self - it would be more appropriate to think of Foucault’s discourse 
analysis as combining the two. In engaging with texts, that is to say with 
practical forms of language use, discourse analysis simultaneously 
engages with questions of power, that is to say with the relationships and 
practices within which discourse is produced.  
This situated conception of discourse analysis further implies that,  
far from considering discourse as a deterministic structure that eliminates  
agency and brings about the death of the subject, Foucault thinks of 
discourse as a productive technology of social practice, which subjects 
people to forms of power while, at the same time, providing them with 
spaces of agency and possibilities for action. I take this Foucauldian 
definition of discourse, where power and meaning always appear in a 
creative tension between agency and constraint, as a normative standard 
for critically evaluating Habermas’ and Derrida’s views on discourse in 
sections 2 and 3 below.  
Whereas the situated and relational nature of meaning- 
making is today commonplace in the analysis of culture, there are 
differences as to how discourse-analytical perspectives conceptualise the 
relationship between meaning and power and, consequently, as to how 
they conceptualise the dynamics of agency and change in cultural 
analysis. It is these tensions that create varying impressions as to what 
Discourse Analysis can or cannot do. My discussion in this chapter then 
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focuses on two key conceptualisations of discourse in cultural analysis, in 
order to clarify the possibilities and limitations of this approach to the 
study of culture. My argument is in three steps. 
In section one, ‘Language, Discourse and Power’, I discuss the  
epistemological premises that inform post-structuralist Discourse 
Analysis, namely the ‘linguistic turn’ with its major ramifications, 
phenomenology, hermeneutics and their critical appropriations in the 
terrain of social constructionism. In section two, ‘Traditions of Discourse 
Analysis’, I assess Habermas’ Discourse Ethics and Derrida’s 
Deconstruction. Each represents a key position within the antagonistic 
field of Discourse Analysis, proposing a different connection between 
meaning and power in cultural life. I argue that whereas Habermas 
emphasises the negative effects of power on meaning-making, Derrida 
thematises text and signification at the expense of broader questions of 
social power; neither of the two, however, adequately resolves the 
tensions involved in the concept of discourse. Finally, in section three, 
‘Discourse Analysis and Contemporary Culture’, I argue that one major 
concern in the study of culture today is to conceptualise and analyse 
discourse under conditions of technological mediation- about which both 
Habermas and Derrida have valuable insights to offer but which, again, 
neither adequately addresses. I conclude that the Discourse Analysis of 
culture today should reflexively navigate between and beyond the two 
positions, across all three dimensions of cultural analysis: the diagnostic 
(is mediation good or bad for our culture?), the epistemological (which 
conception of power and meaning is effective for cultural criticism 
today?) and the methodological (how to analyse language and image as 
inherent properties of our mediated culture?)ii.  
  
 
1. Language, Discourse and Power  
Wittgenstein’s analytical philosophy, which introduces the ‘linguistic 
turn’ in social research, and the appropriation of phenomenology and 
hermeneutics in a theory of power, are the key epistemological 
developments that lead to a post-structuralist conception of discourse in 
the study of culture. It is these developments that I briefly review in this 
section. 
 
The linguistic turn 
The term ‘linguistic turn’ refers to a major shift in social scientific 
research from studying the world as an objective entity that exists ‘out 
there’ to studying the world as a language-mediated process that exists in 
discourse. It was Wittgenstein who reversed this order of inquiry from 
objective reality to language, when he asserted that there is no reality that 
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exists independently of language (Harris 1990: 27-45; Thompson 
1984:67; 281-82).  
Wittgenstein’s concept of the 'language game’ is premised upon  
the idea that the social world consists of different types of language 
activity, each of which is governed by rules specific to its context 
(Wittgenstein, 1958 sec.23). The rule-bound nature of each language 
activity suggests that, much like a game of chess, every linguistic 
utterance makes sense not on its own but only as part of the whole 
activity- hence the metaphor of the ‘game’. It is, in other words, the 
positioning of each utterance in the strategic system of the language game 
that gives the utterance its meaning, rather than any inherent feature of 
the utterance as a linguistic sign, or the intentions of the speaker (Kripke 
1982; Blackburn 1984 for a critical appraisal of Wittgenstein’s position 
on the sociality of meaning production). Language, Wittgenstein asserts, 
is not a private but a social entity and, in its social capacity, language is 
not only about representing the world in words (the referential force of 
utterances) but also about doing things with words (the performative 
force of utterances)iii. In a manner reminiscent of Saussure, as we shall 
see, the metaphor of the language game introduces to philosophical 
inquiry the idea that meaning, far from fixing a stable relationship 
between the human mind and an external object, is itself inherently 
unstable and contingent upon the social rules of human interaction.  
Consequently, the reductive linguistic analysis of early analytical  
philosophy, whereby 'true' meaning was discovered through the formal 
study of sentences, is replaced by a heuristic analysis of how meaning is 
produced in context- in 'reflexive' linguistic analysis, where the analyst 
describes in detail how patterns of language use emerge as people talk 
and interact with one another (Habermas 1967:133-135). Because the 
social world consists of many different patterns of use, describing each 
one of them presupposes that the analyst not only understands the rules of 
each language game but is also able to move between games and through 
the various and incompatible logics of linguistic activity.   
At the same time, in drawing attention to the incompatibility  
between language games, Wittgenstein is criticised for overemphasising 
difference at the expense of regularity across linguistic activities and, 
consequently, for regarding communication as an impossible 
achievement, rather than seeking to understand how communication can 
be achieved through difference. The epistemological relativism of 
cultural analysis, which begins with Winch’s anti-positivism (1958) and 
culminates in Lyotard’s ‘delegitimation’ of the discourse of science 
(1979/1992:40), is premised precisely on the idea that there are as many 
incompatible cultural forms of life and scientific rationalities as there are 
language games, and that these are so different from one another that no 
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comparison or evaluation is possible among them.  
Against this type of relativism, it can be argued that the social  
relations of all language games are relations of power and that the rules of 
the language games are more or less institutionalized in specific fields of 
power - not least in science, where the production of knowledge is a game 
of competing and conflicting interests among paradigms. By regarding all 
games as on a par with one another and yet as radically different from 
each other, the Wittgensteinian perspective not only makes the evaluation 
of cultures and rationalities impossible, it also promotes a conception of 
culture that is devoid of dialogue, conflict and mutual influence, that is to 
say, of the basic dynamics of transformation inherent in every culture.  
 
Phenomenology 
The major premise of the ‘linguistic turn’, namely the language- 
mediated quality of the social world, is shared by another influential 
approach  to the analysis of culture, the  phenomenological analysis of 
everyday life. This is because phenomenology, too, emphasises the role 
of meaning in constituting social reality and relationships. Whereas 
philosophical phenomenology postulates that it is human consciousness 
which construes the world and, therefore, remains pre-linguistic in its 
conception of human action, sociological phenomenology postulates that 
it is human interaction that construes the world as common to all social 
actors (Schultz 1960, 1962)iv.  
The commonness of the world, or its ‘intersubjectivity’, is the key  
research focus for the group of phenomenological research traditions 
known as Action theories: 'how can two or more actors share common 
experiences of the natural and the social world and, relatedly, how can 
they communicate about them?' (Heritage 1984:54).Action theories 
include the traditions of Ethnomethodology and Conversational Analysis, 
both heavily influential in social research. Despite their differences 
(Cicourel 2006), these traditions introduce to the study of culture the 
concept of linguistic performativity- a concept which, echoing 
Wittgenstein, refers to the power of language not only to represent but 
also to act upon the world in ways that have concrete effects on people. 
Language here ‘performs’ cultural identity, say gender or ethnic, through 
the use of speech acts and the management of utterances in specific 
interactions- an insight that, as we shall see in section 2, also informs 
Derrida’s post-structuralist view of discourse. 
The sociological inquiry into intersubjectivity, it follows, is not a  
theoretical but a practical project, which seeks to establish how people 
jointly produce and organise their lifeworld through local acts of 
conversation (Giddens 1993:34). Consequently, the methodology of 
Action Theories is empirical, invariably involving the analysis of 
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conversational texts through which social actors work towards a common 
understanding of the situation. Discourse Analysis categories that are 
extensively used and draw upon Action Theories include the ‘sequential 
organisation of speech’ (the overall logic of a stretch of talk), ‘turn 
taking’ (who speaks in which order), ‘adjacency pair’ (exchange units of 
dialogue, such as Question-Response) and ‘indexicality’ (language that 
refers to social realities beyond the text itself, by use of pronouns, 
adverbials of place and time)- for a critical overview of the methods and 
vocabulary of action theories see Thompson (1984: 98-118). 
It is their insistence on things not as they ‘really’ are but rather as  
they are performed in language that brings the ‘linguistic turn’ and 
phenomenology together. Their common ground is a conception of reality 
that rests on the interpretations of its actors and a conception of science 
that does not seek a foundational ‘truth’ about how the world is. The 
difference between the two is that phenomenology locates the source of 
meaning and of human action in the language use of individual actors, 
rather than in the social rules of the language game.  
From a post-structuralist perspective, then, the main criticism  
to be made of the phenomenological analysis of culture is that it tends to 
reduce the social world to the linguistic representations of its actors; in 
Bourdieu's words, phenomenological science is 'the purest expression of 
the subjectivist vision' (1990:125). In its emphasis on the subjective 
dimension of social interaction, the criticism goes, phenomenology 
ignores historical and structural aspects of the social world, which may 
act upon social actors but which actors may not be able to directly 
perceive (for Foucault’s ambivalent connection with phenomenology see 
Oksala  2005; Hann 2002; Rajan 2002). 
This may be because phenomenology has a somewhat   
‘individualist’ view of meaning, which conceives of language as a 
resource possessed and used by the individual at her own will. Rather 
than being a historical resource that positions social actors in social 
contexts of power, language is something that speech participants apply 
to their own purposes and effects- although always jointly and in 
interaction. As a consequence, social reality is not structurally prior to the 
individual but always re-invented from the particular horizon of the 
speech participant. Society in phenomenology is constituted 
egocentrically rather than socially, as Habermas puts it (1967/1988:107).  
 
Hermeneutics 
In contrast to the methodological ‘egocentrism’ of phenomenology,  
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, one of the most influential research paradigms 
of the social sciences, considers meaning to be an ontological condition 
of social life that pre-exists the individual and defines the individual’s 
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perception of self and others. In line with the ‘linguistic turn’, 
hermeneutics claims that there is no such thing as the ‘social’ before our 
ability to put it into language. It is the historical nature of language or, 
more accurately, the horizon of interpretation that linguistic 
communication has historically constructed, that provides the conditions 
for understanding our world- what Gadamer calls ‘tradition’. Tradition 
introduces into the study of culture a historical macro-perspective on 
language as a generalised resource of symbolic definition that shapes our 
sense of social reality. In this, it corrects Wittgenstein’s conception of the 
language game that ignores the ‘macro’ in favour of a ‘micro’-perspective 
on what is specific, distinct and different from others in each language 
game (Outhwaite 1987:69).  
At the same time, the understanding of language in terms of  
broad historical structures of meaning also challenges the 
phenomenological approach to culture as the sum of subjective acts of 
interpretation. By expanding the concept of culture beyond the local 
procedures of meaning-making, hermeneutics introduces into cultural 
analysis the idea that language is itself bigger than culture, encompassing 
‘everything, not only the culture that has been handed down through 
language, but absolutely everything...’ (Gadamer 1976:25). Social, 
political and even economic realities are here considered to be parts of 
human experience mediated through language much like a ‘mirror’ that 
‘reflects everything that is’ (1976:31).  
The study of culture, it follows, coincides with the study of  
linguistic communication that, located as it is in the historical horizon of 
tradition, always involves an analysis of texts from within the limits of 
traditionv. In the absence of an outside point of view, cultural analysis 
inevitably moves within the ‘hermeneutic circle’ of understanding, which  
uses the linguistic resources available in culture at any point in time, in 
order to reach deeper insights into human societies.  
The 'hermeneutic circle', however, can easily turn into a vicious  
circle of relativism. Hermeneutics may rightly draw our attention to the 
inescapable situatedness of understanding, but it does not locate the act of 
understanding in concrete power structures that provide the specific 
positions from which cultural interpretations emerge. If everything is 
constituted within the totalizing whole of language and of tradition, there 
is no way of formulating normative criteria according to which different 
types of interpretation are evaluated against one another. Hermeneutics, 
in other words, acknowledges difference, linguistic or cultural, but it does 
not evaluate it.  
      From a Foucauldian perspective, we may consider the lack of a 
normative dimension in the hermeneutic analysis of culture to be related 
to its rather idealistic view of language (Outhwaite 1987: 61-71). As the 
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primary order of experience, language is somehow located beyond actual 
social contexts and above the dynamics of history or the politics of social 
groups. Rather than producing specific and differentiated effects of 
power, language serves simply to mediate the world, constituting what 
Gadamer calls ‘the totality of our experience in the world’ (1975:xiii).  
Yet, if we accept that language is inherently implicated in struggles  
over power, then we cannot regard it as simply a benign means of 
reflecting ‘everything that is’ because not all that there is may be 
reflected. Rather, language is also a means of exercising power and it is 
itself a site of competing representations of the world (Habermas 
1967/1988:172)vi. Despite its interest in the broader conditions of 
meaning-making, hermeneutics shares with Action Theories an ultimately 
subjectivist view of the social world as existing in so far as it is perceived 
to exist by its actors- albeit not from the perspective of the individual 
consciousness but from the perspective of the collective consciousness of 
tradition (Outhwaite 1987:74). 
 
Social Constructionism: Post-structuralism and Critical Theory  
          Post-‘linguistic turn’ approaches to cultural analysis constitute, 
broadly, the terrain of social constructionism. This is the terrain of a set 
of powerful epistemologies which break with science as the reflection of 
a positive reality and view science as itself a language game that 
constructs its objects of study through its own linguistic practices. In so 
doing, social constructionism not only opens up a critical outlook on to 
the modes of rationality through which scientific knowledge is produced, 
but also shifts the agenda of social research towards the study of human 
action as an inherently linguistic endeavour (Giddens 1993:75; Outhwaite 
1987:10).  
There is, however, a problem with these social constructionist  
epistemologies. All of them acknowledge, or even celebrate, difference 
between language games, between individualised acts of conversation or 
between traditions and cultures as an inherent trait of meaning-making 
that resides in the very structure of forms of life (in Wittgenstein), 
patterns of interaction (in action theories) or historical structures of 
meaning (in hermeneutics). None of them, however, acknowledges the 
existence of difference in social relations of power as an integral part of 
the work of language in constituting the social world. As a consequence, 
none of these social constructionist epistemologies are able to account for 
experience that goes beyond the appearance of the world in the speakers’ 
language, nor can they explain cultural change that takes place through 
conflict and competition rather than free will and consensus among social 
actors. 
The idea that power penetrates and organises the practices of  
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language use is established in the social sciences through two major 
perspectives: the post-structuralist perspective, which I outlined earlier 
with reference to Foucault, and the critical perspective, which is broadly 
associated with neo-Marxism and with the Frankfurt School. Their 
common argument is that linguistic difference is difference between 
social groups and cultures and that such difference is consolidated in 
historical processes of struggle rather than being a benign feature of 
tradition that can be overcome through dialogue.  
The two perspectives differ in their conceptualisations of the  
relationship between meaning and power. For post-structuralism, this 
relationship is inherent to the very idea of discourse and linguistic 
practice, since for Foucault, let us recall, there is no meaning without a 
power position that enunciates it. As a consequence, for post-
structuralists, culture is a regime of ‘power/knowledge’ - the slash 
signifying the inseparability of the two-, and social change can only occur 
as a tactical shift in the regime’s power relations rather than as the utopia 
of a power-free culture. This constitutive link between meaning and 
power, in post-structuralism, has led to versions of Discourse Analysis 
that equate culture with meaning, power with the ‘plays’ of textual 
difference, and social change with novel combinations of texual signs 
(Bennett 1992: 24-29 ; 2003: 47-63 for a criticism). In the next section,  
I critically discuss Derrida’s Deconstruction as an exemplary case of 
‘textualist’ Discourse Analysis. 
For neo-Marxism and the Frankfurt School, in contrast,  
language and power are organised around economic and political 
structures of domination and, therefore, changes in such structures also 
entail the promise of power-free communication. For neo-Marxist 
approaches, the relationship between meaning and power takes the form 
of ideological domination. Gramsci’s term ‘hegemony’, one of the most 
influential concepts of power in cultural studies, focuses precisely on 
language as an instrument for constructing the ‘common-sense’ of 
culture, rather than taking economic interest to be the driving force of 
social dynamics. Breaking from Marxist determinism, this line of 
thinking introduces a cultural-linguistic perspective into political analysis 
and renders culture a significant terrain for social and political change. 
Influential in British Cultural and Media Studies as well as Political 
Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis, especially during in the 80s and 
90s, neo-Marxist concepts such as ‘hegemony’, ‘articulation’ and ‘rule by 
consent’ are today an integral part of the critical vocabulary of the social 
sciencesvii.  
The Frankfurt School has, similarly, focused upon the analysis of  
social power and culture, with important contributions to the study of 
mass popular culture and the emergence of consumer and media culture 
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in capitalist modernity. But it does so at the expense of engaging with the 
role of language in social life. The exception is Habermas’s seminal 
theory of ‘communicative action’ and his thesis of Discourse Ethics, 
which I here take as the exemplary approach of a power-oriented 
Discourse Analysis in the study of culture.  
Section 2, ‘Traditions of Discourse Analysis’, discusses the  
discourse approaches of Habermas and Derrida, in order to argue that, 
whereas neither adequately addresses the duality of discourse as both 
meaning and power, a dialogic juxtaposition of the two can contribute 
important perspectives to the critical analysis of culture.  
 
2. Traditions of Discourse Analysis  
 
Far from exhaustive, the approaches of this section illustrate two key 
positions in the study of contemporary culture from the perspective of 
discourse. Habermas represents a power-oriented analysis of discursive 
communication in public life and Derrida represents a textualist approach 
to discourse analysis. For different reasons, these approaches to culture 
do not ultimately manage to account for the dual dimension of discourse 
both as power and as meaning- both as social and historical relations and 
as material technologies of text.  
I wish to argue that cultural analysis today would benefit  
from a dialogic approach that keeps in creative tension the textualist 
interest in the production of meaning with the interest in power and its 
specific and material articulations with discourse. As I claim in section 3, 
given that our culture is today thoroughly mediated by diverse 
technologies (from print and electronic to digital media) and types of 
mediation (mass, interactive or personalised), the analysis of culture 
needs to incorporate a more historicised view of discourse both as 
systemically embedded in the material technologies of texts, bringing 
together the semiotics of language-image-sound, and as socially 
embedded in asymmetrical relationships of media interaction, engaging 
audiences in subtle forms of agency and subjectification. 
 
Habermas’ ‘Discourse Ethics’  
Habermas’ theory of discourse stems from his own critical  
engagement with hermeneutic research, where he advocates that 
hermeneutics has to be complemented by 'a reflection upon the limits  
of hermeneutic understanding' itself (1982: 190). Discourse Ethics is just 
such a reflection. Following hermeneutics, Habermas recognises that 
knowledge formation takes place within the limitations of language and 
simultaneously, pushing hermeneutics to its limits, he recognises that 
relations of power constrain and shape the production of knowledge 
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(Outhwaite 1987: 61). Discourse Ethics is, in this sense, Habermas’ 
attempt to analyse communication, subjective and power-ladden as it 
always is, through a set of inter-subjective rules of evaluation that are 
themselves not distorted by power- and therefore to be able to identify the 
degree to which the four main validity claims to speech are upheld in any 
communicative practice.  
Discourse, in this context, is that particular form of  
communication which is comprehensible, truthful, sincere and 
appropriate for all participants independently of their status (Searle 1969). 
Because power is always implicated in real communicative encounters, 
however, Habermas’ discourse only refers to an ‘ideal speech situation’ 
that is free of the pressures of hierarchical relations and therefore can 
apply the ‘universal’ principles of fair conversation ( for criticisms see 
Thompson 1984: 273-4; Hoy & McCarthy 1995:177-88; Butler 1997: 86-
8).  
For this reason, we should not view Habermas’ discourse as being  
about linguistic practices as such. Discourse, or Diskurs, refers rather to 
an analytical norm that defines the degree to which actual linguistic 
practices distort communication, by systematically ignoring the validity 
claims of speech. Despite mainstream classifications, Habermas’s 
Discourse Ethics and the Foucauldian concept of discourse are not purely 
antithetical. Their convergence (Hanssen 2000:1-14) lies precisely in 
Habermas’ refusal to think of language independently of power. It lies 
moreover in his belief that cultural change is constituted through the 
dynamics of discourse as communicative action. Discourse Ethics, 
similarly to Foucault, is therefore grounded in a view of discourse as 
praxis, as procedure rather than ‘content’ of communication. Where 
Habermas differs from Foucauldian post-structuralism is in his insistence 
that, after all, language and power can and should be dislocated, in the 
realm of the ‘ideal speech situation’. Habermas’ concept of discourse 
then may be called paradoxical, in so far as it both points to the 
inseparability of language and power in contemporary culture and, at the 
same time, anticipates their separation in the ideal of power-free cultural 
encounters.   
From this perspective, Habermas’ Discourse Analysis is not simply  
a proposal for the scientific analysis of culture beyond hermeneutics. It is 
also, importantly, a proposal for the conduct of cultural life today, in his 
theory of the public sphere- Discourse Ethics pointing precisely to the 
ethics of public conduct that this theory of discourse seeks to formulate. 
Consequently, the ambivalence in Habermas’ concept of discourse throws 
into relief another paradox- a paradox in Habermas’ concept of culture.  
Habermas’ view of discourse has two implications for 
his view of culture. First, in evoking the ‘ideal speech situation’, 
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Habermas poses a strict normative standard as to how our public life 
should look: it should be culture without power. Indeed, even though the 
concepts of public sphere and culture cannot be conflated, Habermas does 
not strictly differentiate the two. In defining the public sphere as the 
sphere of lifeworld relations enacted in a public space of deliberation, 
Habermas’ view of culture emerges as a hybrid concept. Culture brings 
together, on the one hand, the practices of everyday life and the figure of 
the private person (the lifeworld) and, on the other hand, the practices of 
civil society and the figure of the citizen (the public). In this view of 
culture, it is the citizen who brings everyday life under the public 
spotlight and turns the private into a legitimate object of collective 
deliberation, under conditions of rational-critical discourse (Gardiner 
2004: 28-46; Fraser 1989: 113-43).  
Whereas it may be argued, conversely, that it is purely the  
lifeworld, that is to say ‘the linguistically organised stock of interpretive 
patterns’ (Habermas 1987: 124), which constitutes culture as a collective 
resource for people’s everyday acts of understanding, in fact Habermas’ 
insistence on the norm of communication without power necessarily 
always brings into his definition of culture the rationality of the ‘ideal 
speech situation’- a public rationality, par excellence. This is because the 
lifeworld, protected as it is from institutional authority and expert 
systems, consists primarily of sedimented ideologies and unexamined 
values and interpretations. How else, then, could these ‘doxas’ of the 
lifeworld become amenable to intersubjective judgement and, thereby, 
lead to a fairer conduct of dialogue, unless they were elevated to the 
rational critical discourse of the public sphere and became subject to the 
test of the validity claims of speech?   
The first problem, therefore, with Habermas’ Discourse Ethics is  
an ambivalence in his conceptual account of culture. Culture is, on the 
one hand, lifeworld relations, (theoretically) immune to the erosion of 
systems of power but full of unreflexive ‘doxas’, and, on the other hand, a 
characteristically civil phenomenon that is capable of subjecting these 
‘doxas’ to rational criticism (Gardiner 2004: 41; Fraser 1989: 122-29; 
Thompson 1984:273-74). Whereas culture, as we shall see below, is 
better conceptualised as the co-articulation of the two- that is, forms of 
knowledge and belief in the lifeworld together with the overt forms of 
rationalisation in public life- and cultural analysis is, therefore, about 
rendering explicit the boundaries of tension between the two, Habermas 
remains unhelpfully suspended between asserting their clear 
differentiation and, simultaneously, eliding their articulation (Fraser 
1989: 113-143). 
It is evident that the elision between lifeworld and the public has to  
do with Habermas’ belief that communication without power, Diskurs, is 
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the most desirable form of communication in our culture. Yet, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, Habermas’ Discourse Ethics unduly imposes 
one specific norm of communication, power-free communication, as the 
‘universal’ norm of public ethics- a norm for all times and all societies. 
Rather than considering power to be a productive economy of culture, 
both (potentially) positive in that it makes possible all forms of 
communication in the lifeworld and the public, but also (potentially) 
negative in that it creates hierarchies between the lifeworld and the public 
or between the private person and the citizen, Habermas only thinks of 
power as something negative, a distortion that we must eliminate (Fraser 
1997:76; Calhoun 1995:75).   
Habermas’ ‘universal’ norm of discourse brings me to the  
second implication of his concept of culture. Culture, for him, should be 
about communication in face-to-face encounters; about dialogue that 
requires the presence of participants in speech. This is no longer an 
argument about the validity conditions of communication, or Diskurs, but  
an argument about the historical conditions under which our culture came 
to lose its public life and, with it, the promise of undistorted 
communication. This historical understanding of the conditions of 
communication today, however, still evokes the ideal of undistorted 
communication as the ‘paradise lost’ of contemporary culture and blames 
the mass media for this loss.  
The mass media, Habermas argues, are responsible for  
transforming what used to be a public space of active deliberation over 
lifeworld matters into a mass culture that thrives on the passive 
consumption of spectacleviii. Drawing on the critical legacy of the 
Frankfurt School, Habermas accuses the media, particularly television, 
that they manipulate public opinion for political power and for economic 
profit. Culture, in this account, is seen as increasingly conquered by 
systems of power that corrode critical discourse through the trojan horse 
of mediated entertainment.  
The second problem with Habermas’ Discourse Ethics then 
lies in an ambivalence in his historical account of culture. How can the 
ideal of undistorted communication survive in a culture where the vast 
majority of public talk takes place in and through the media? Is mediated 
lifeworld a dimension of culture still ‘protected’ by systems of power or 
is it colonised (‘re-feudalised’ as Habermas says) by them? And is the 
mediated public a dimension of culture that could promise the ideal of 
civil judgement or does it only serve specific political and economic 
interests? As before, Habermas does not seem to see the two sides of each 
tension as a matter of particular articulations in specific contexts and 
moments in time. These tensions of culture remain as unresolved 
paradoxes throughout his work.  
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It is evident that Habermas’ problem with the pervasive mediation  
of culture today has to do with his idea that face-to-face communication 
is more desirable than the mediated. Indeed, the key argument of 
Habermas’ account on the transformation of the public sphere associates 
the decline of face-to-face communication, in the 18th century public 
debates of the Viennese coffee house, with the rise of electronic 
technologies that promote one-way communication flows- a form of 
‘quasi-interaction’ in contrast to the ‘dialogic interaction’ of physical 
proximity (Thompson 1995 for the vocabulary).  
From a Foucauldian perspective, again, Habermas’ Discourse  
Ethics can be criticised not only in so far as its conceptual account of 
culture takes power-free communication to be a ‘universal’ norm of 
communication, but also in so far as its historical account of the present 
elevates face-to-face dialogue to a ‘universal’ norm of public life. At a 
time when contemporary culture is constituted by mediation, Habermas 
insists on looking back to unmediated dialogue as the one desirable norm 
for communication for all societies and all times.  
In summary, Habermas’ Discourse Ethics seeks to provide the  
analysis of culture with a measure that distinguishes ethical from 
unethical, fair from unfair, manipulative from genuine communication. 
However, his approach has a rigidly normative orientation that fails to 
acknowledge both the positive role of power in enabling the ongoing 
production of culture through communication and the presence of 
mediation in contemporary culture. As a consequence, his Discourse 
Ethics gives rise to pessimistic accounts of contemporary culture and, 
importantly, it does not provide a perspective on change in a culture that 
is increasingly saturated by media technologies and communications.  
Derrida’s Deconstruction builds upon a less universal and more situated 
account of discourse and, thereby, develops a more optimistic view of 
contemporary culture. But, again, this is not without costs for cultural 
analysis.  
 
Derrida’s ‘Deconstruction’ 
Derrida’s theory of discourse stems from a critical engagement not with 
hermeneutics, as does Habermas’, but with structuralism. Following 
Saussurian linguistics, Derrida recognises that all forms of knowledge 
arise out of the meaning relations - relations of opposition and 
combination - inherent in language structure; simultaneously, pushing 
structuralism to its limits, Derrida claims that these relations of meaning 
have a capacity for re-combination that transcends the closed structure of 
language.In this sense, Derrida is concerned less with language as a 
system of signs and more with discourse understood as an open field of 
meaning relations, which cannot be fully predicted by its system and 
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which fully constitutes our experience of the world.  
Discourse, in Derrida, is therefore something very different from   
Habermas’‘ideal speech situation’. Discourse is the condition of 
possibility for any speech situation, in so far as it is a loose quasi-
structure that enables the mobility of all linguistic signs in infinite 
combinations of text. Meaning, it follows, is always an unfinished 
business because these signs constantly alter their relationship to other 
signs as they travel from context to context. Traces of signs exhibit a 
minimal sameness in the different contexts in which they appear, yet they 
are slightly modified in these new contexts (Howarth 2000:41). It is the 
capacity of the sign both to appear different and to be recognized as the 
same, the ‘iterability’ of discourse, that lies at the heart of Derrida’s 
project of Deconstruction.  
Deconstruction is an analytical project which aims at  
demonstrating that all dominant systems of thought emerge through 
discourse and, therefore, are contingent and fragile constructions rather 
than absolute truths. The key deconstructive practice is to subject texts to 
analysis of their discursive elements, in order to show how these texts 
privilege certain meanings at the expense of others and, in so doing, 
manage to construe specific regimes of meaning as ‘the’ truth. The 
discourse analysis of Deconstruction proceeds in two moves.  
First, it involves a re-description of the linguistic features of the  
text in order to show, in an ‘interior’ reading, how these features are put 
together in a coherent whole, by suppressing the meaning potential 
inherent in the oppositions of language - such as self-Other, white-black, 
male-female. Second, it seeks to establish, from an ‘exterior’ position, 
how the text succeeds in producing its specific topic in meaning by fixing 
‘points of undecidability’, that is by imposing one dominant meaning 
over other possible alternatives- self over Other, white over black, male 
over female. This second move is key to Deconstruction. It shows that, 
whilst every text is produced at the expense of suppressing the iterability 
of discourse, it is also always undermined by these very oppositions of 
meaning that, in seeking to suppress them, the text inevitably carries.  
The idea that the text is an inherently ambivalent construct is  
the most important tenet in Derridean discourse analysis and, broadly,  
in post-structuralist thinking. In opposition to Habermas’ ‘universalism’, 
where the removal of differences of power guarantees ideal forms of 
speech, Derrida tells us that the production of meaning  never escapes  
the constraints of its context- meaning is radically historical and, 
therefore, always partial and incomplete.  
How exactly does the concept of culture figure in Derrida’s  
conception of discourse and what implications does this concept have for 
the analysis of culture? As in the discussion of Habermas, I address a 
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conceptual and a historical dimension of Derrida’s definition of cultureix.  
First, the conceptual dimension. Derrida’s concept of discourse  
implies that culture does not pre-exist the performative force of 
signification. It is, therefore, impossible to fix people’s identities, as 
private or public, before they are performed in discourse, and it is equally 
impossible to assume people’s sense of community with others as pre-
existing its construction in discourse.  
Central to this performative conception of culture is Derrida’s deep  
suspicion towards speech- a mode of communication that favours the 
proximity of face-to-face over the written word. Derrida’s broader 
critique of western modernity as ‘logocentric’ challenges precisely the 
key role that speech plays in our understandings of culture as a matter of 
‘being-together’ and of the public as a conversation among equals-  
the Habermasian view. At the same time, Derrida’s critique of 
‘logocentrism’ is simultaneously a re-appraisal of the written mode of 
communication and its dual function: to produce meaning, as speech 
does, but also, in so doing, to inscribe meaning onto various materialities, 
from stone to paper to analogue and digital surfaces (Derrida 1976: 27-
64). It is this capacity for inscribing and, thereby, reproducing meaning 
through various media of representation that is essential, for Derrida, in 
constituting any form of sociability, including our current cultural and 
political communities (Howarth 2000: 36-42).   
The mediation of meaning through technologies of recording is,  
by this token, also constitutive of culture because mediation enables the 
dispersal of discourse beyond the locales of immediate interaction and de-
couples communication from any particular person as the sovereign and 
embodied author of discourse. Derrida’s culture, in this sense, consist of 
spaces of discourse that are constantly disarticulated and rearticulated 
through those technologies of meaning that bring them into being as, 
specifically, political or cultural, public or lifeworld.   
This view of culture manages to avoid Habermas’ normative  
standard that our public life should involve culture without power. It is 
evident that Derrida does not consider social differences, reflected as they 
are in communication practices, to be a problem that, once eliminated, 
would lead to the elimination of inequalities in the conduct of public life. 
Yet, precisely because difference for him is primarily a systemic category 
that originates in language – society itself being structured ‘like 
language’-, Derrida does not adequately deal with social relations of 
power (Caputo 1997: 104; Butler 1997:150-1; Said 1978:703). 
Power in Deconstruction appears only as a constraint upon the  
workings of the text. And because it never transcends the materiality of 
semiotic codes, power never becomes something that is located in 
specific contexts of human action with their own institutional and 
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material character. A consequence of this thorough textualisation of 
culture is that Derrida further fails to install analytical distinctions 
between spheres of human practice, such as culture, society or politics 
(Rose 1999; Bennett 2003). These historically distinct domains of social 
practice are subsumed under the all-encompassing category of discourse 
and their analysis is reduced to the indiscriminate deconstruction of texts 
in terms of their ‘play of differences’ and linguistic effects.  
This brings me to the historical dimension of Derrida’s  
concept of culture. To be sure, Derrida’s diagnosis of contemporary 
culture as thoroughly mediated is more positive than Habermas’. For 
Derrida, the transformations that the media bring about in our cultural 
experience today, either in global broadcasting or new media 
interactivity, are simply a radicalisation of iterability; after all, the 
deferrals and shifts of meaning across media and their contexts of use 
have always been a part and parcel of communication. Questions of truth 
and authenticity, proximity and distance, self and ‘other’, which have 
always haunted the debate on cultural publics and political communities, 
Derrida argues, today return with a vengeance, demanding new answers 
in the contexts of electronic and digital media.  
Nevertheless, this positive narrative does not go with a  
concrete historical account of the relationship between media and culture. 
How can we best conceptualise the power of the media today and how 
can such conceptualisations contribute, as Derrida himself envisages, to 
the critical project of imagining ‘global cultures’ or ‘cosmopolitan 
subjects’? How can we understand the impact of interactive texts of new 
media technologies on new cultural collectivities- as an expansion of 
consumption or as an emerging sense of publicness? Derrida does not 
address such questions. He does not offer adequate insight into the 
material conditions and the specific logics of power, which make our 
mediated culture what it is today. This neglect is probably due to the 
general detachment that characterises Derrida’s project of Deconstruction 
towards the specificity and historicity of practices of cultural life 
(Howarth 2000: 46). 
As a consequence, Deconstruction also demonstrates a certain  
indifference towards the discourse analysis of contemporary texts of 
mediation that go beyond traditional forms of signification, such as the 
moving image or multi-media interfaces- even though Derrida 
acknowledges the semiotic complexity of such texts and  gestures 
towards the importance of developing a new analytics of the image 
(2002: 263).  
In summary, Derrida offers a situated account of our culture as  
discourse, which rests on the capacity of signification to bring  culture 
into being and on the affirmation that mediation, far from a necessary 
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evil, is the very condition of possibility for contemporary culture. 
Derrida’s account, however, does not include an understanding of power 
as a social category that organises relationships between groups and 
individuals, and, therefore, his account tends to reduce power to linguistic 
oppositions within texts and to limit social agency to the regimes of 
action provided by texts themselves.  
While Habermas’ Discourse Ethics privileges social relations of 
power over the performativity of discourse and, thereby, reduces 
discourse to a ‘universal’ norm in the service of his ideal of power 
free culture, Derrida’s deconstruction privileges performativity 
over social power and, thereby, ignores the historical and material 
constraints of culture that always already regulate the 
performativity of discourse. What I suggest, in section 3, is a 
dialogic navigation between and beyond the two, which avoids the 
shortcomings of Discourse Ethics and Deconstruction whilst, 
simultaneously, it recognises the constitutive role of mediated 
discourse in our culture and the pressing dilemmas that such 
discourse confronts us with today.   
 
3. Discourse Analysis and Contemporary Culture  
 
Discourse Ethics and Deconstruction disagree in their conceptual 
approaches to discourse. Yet, their accounts of contemporary culture 
agree that discourse today is thoroughly mediated. Mediation is a key 
dimension of our culture and Discourse Analysis can now barely address 
the dynamics of culture independently its contexts of mediation. In this 
section, I take my point of departure in the mediated quality of our culture 
and address three dimensions of cultural analysis that the discursive 
perspective can usefully address. These dimensions are the diagnostic (in 
Diagnostics of Culture and Phronetic Research), the epistemological (in 
Analytics of Culture: Difference within and Outside the Semiotic) and the 
methodological (in The Discourse Analysis of Culture: Critical and 
Multi-modal perspectives).  
 
Diagnostics of Culture and Phronetic Research  
At the heart of both accounts of culture, in Discourse Ethics and in 
Deconstruction, lies the question of the ethics of mediationx. Habermas’ 
pessimism expresses disillusionment with the promise of the mass media 
to re-invent the conditions of proximity necessary for public dialogue 
and, thereby, to deliver the goods of a democratic politics and an 
inclusive culturexi. If Habermas’ ethical problem with mediation refers 
primarily to the cultural space of the western nation-state, the ‘democratic 
sovereign’ as he calls it, Derrida poses the ethical problem of mediation 
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in a more cosmopolitan manner. In Derrida’s optimistic account, the 
question of ethics is essentially one about how we western spectators 
manage our encounter with the ‘arrivant’, the cultural ‘other’ who enters 
our homes through the media and demands our attention, emotion and 
even action (Derrida 2002: 11-16).  
A key concern in both accounts is the ‘de-territorialisation’  
of experience that mediation brings about in our culture: the experience 
of connecting us with dispersed locations and people around the globe 
without, at the same time, giving us the option to communicate with or 
act upon them, in any meaningful way.  
 
Normative Values and Cultural Theory : This is not a new problem.  
The majority of cultural theory acknowledges that the discursive power of 
the media lies precisely in their power to make the spectators witness 
distant realities and events otherwise unavailable to them (Peters 1999; 
Tester 2001; Ellis 2001; Silverstone 1999, 2006). This witnessing 
function of mediation is the most profound moral claim upon 
contemporary cultural identities, dividing cultural theory into two types 
of diagnosis concerning the role of the media as agents of moral 
responsibility: an optimistic and a pessimistic diagnosis (Tester 2001; 
Chouliaraki 2006: 23-9).  
  The optimistic diagnosis celebrates the proliferation of  
mediated signs, linguistic and visual, because this diffusion of messages 
facilitates our engagement with other places and people across the globe 
and brings about a ‘democratization’ of responsibility and a new 
cosmopolitan disposition (Giddens 1990, 1991; Thompson 1990, 1995; 
Tomlinson 1999). This is, essentially, a positive interpretation of 
Derrida’s idea that the media accentuate the natural iterability of 
discourse- an interpretation that becomes, eventually, appropriated in a 
‘happy story’ of ethical action. The pessimistic diagnosis, by contrast, 
laments the fact that the media sensationalize or exotize distant places 
and people and turn their realities, often realities of suffering and war, 
into spectacles for consumption (Tester 2001:1-9; Miller 1971:183). This 
cultural pessimism echoes Habermas’ criticism of the media, on the 
grounds that they entertain the illusion of engaging with public life when, 
in fact, they commodify information and aestheticize politics.  
Evidently, these two diagnostic positions concerning the ethics  
of mediation today draw upon normative claims about the role of 
discourse in culture: mediated discourse is treated as either inherently 
good, under the influence of a Derridean view, or as inherently bad, under 
the influence of, among others, a Habermasian viewxii.  
The Foucauldian perspective on discourse, however, understands  
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the mediation of culture as a ‘power/knowledge’ regime - a regime of 
meanings with its own historical relations of power, which defines how 
specific media produce ethical discourse in their institutional contexts of 
operation. This Foucauldian position challenges the diagnostic ethos of 
cultural theory on the grounds that it is prematurely normative: it already 
entails an implicit evaluation of discourse, optimistic or pessimistic, 
before it empirically investigates concrete practices of mediation.  
 
Normative Values and Discourse Analysis: The Foucauldian position on 
discourse maintains that the potential of mediation to cultivate a 
sensibility beyond the ‘at home’ is neither de facto possible, as in the 
optimistic diagnosis, nor a priori impossible, as in the pessimistic 
diagnosis. The potential of mediation to deterritorialize our ethical 
sensibilities, as much as it deterritorializes our technological contact with 
the ‘other’, has its own historical and social conditions of possibility.  
This diagnostic ethos in cultural analysis is characteristic of the  
Aristotelian practice of phronesis (practical or everyday reason), which 
deals with the question of culture and ethical norms from the concrete 
perspective of praxisxiii. Phronesis approaches ethics as the situated 
enactment of values in the discursive practices of culture, rather than as a 
priori norms that regulate our narratives of culture (Flyvebjerg 2001: 53-
65). Phronetic discourse analysis, in this sense, is a form of critical 
inquiry that regards texts as particular instantiations of those public 
values and norms that, at a particular moment in time, happen to be 
dominant in our culture- hence their ‘universal’ status.   
The normative perspective of phronetic discourse analysis, it  
follows, neither pre-supposes Habermas’ ‘universal’ value of power-free 
culture, rendering any account of mediated culture pessimistic, nor does it  
dissolve media power into the Derridean ‘plays of difference’ on the 
surface of particular texts. Rather, the normative perspective of phronetic 
discourse analysis seeks to show that every text entails its own struggle of 
‘universal’ vs ‘particular’ meanings and that the dominance of certain 
meanings as ‘universal’ is an effect of the relations of power in which the 
text is embedded.  
Phronetic discourse analysis, therefore, begins with the question of  
‘how’: how the texts of mediation manage to ‘universalise’ certain ethical 
meanings whilst suppressing others as ‘particular’. Whereas this 
formulation of discourse analysis is reminiscent of Derridean 
Deconstruction, the concern with power, to which I return just below, 
provides a critical corrective in the diagnostic capacity of Derridean 
discourse analysis. In place of the various diagnoses of culture, with their 
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implicit normativity, phronetic Discourse Analysis proposes a 
Diagnostics of culture: a procedure of critical engagement with concrete 
texts, which, in their cumulative production and consumption come to 
shape our present as a particular historical moment.  
 
Analytics of Culture: Difference Within and Outside the Semiotic 
A diagnostics of culture takes its point of departure in the claim that our 
involvement in culture, mediated and de-territorialized as it is, rests upon 
ethical values that appear as ‘universal’ but are, in fact, construed by the 
semiotic choices of texts of mediation and by the relations of power that 
these practices of mediation articulate and reflect.   
What this means is that the shift towards a phronetic discourse  
analysis of culture is not only a shift from normative diagnoses of culture 
towards situated practices of mediation- texts. It is also a shift in 
understanding the role of power in culture and the ways in which power 
may appear in the form of texts. This poses a problem of epistemology 
for cultural analysis, because it has implications as to how we 
conceptualise power as an analytical category.  
 
Difference within and outside the semiotic:  For Derrida, let us recall, 
power resides in meaning itself and is conceptualised as difference within 
the semiotic system of language. This leads to a textualist bias, which 
often tends to understand cultural politics as a play of linguistic 
difference. Informing the majority of post-modern cultural studies, 
particularly the paradigm of audience studies, the textualist emphasis 
often tends to celebrates pleasure, consumption and individual 
empowerment- what McGuigan calls ‘cultural populism’ (1992).  
For Habermas, on the other hand, power resides outside  
semiotic systems and is conceptualised as difference in society; 
difference, here, either traverses social relations between people, and can 
be bracketed out in the ‘ideal speech situation’, or lies in the political-
economic relations of technology, and distorts public communication. 
This type of ‘universalism’ harmonises with traditional Political 
Economy studies of media industries, which emphasise the dependence of 
mediation on economic interest and, in a deterministic manner, deny the 
possibility that the media produce critical discourse.  
What we need for an analysis of mediation that avoids textualism  
and universalism is a view of power which refers simultaneously to both 
types of difference: difference that is textual or difference within the 
semiotic, following Derrida, and difference that is social or difference 
outside the semiotic, following Habermas. Useful, to this end, is the 
distinction between discourse as a power/knowledge regime, which –as 
we have seen- places emphasis on the textual or semiotic side of 
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discourse, and discourse as governmentality, which places emphasis on 
the side of discourse as a contemporary form of power that seeks to 
govern populations and individuals through the ‘micro’-practices of their 
everyday conduct. Whereas both sides of the distinction 
(power/knowledge and governmentality) take into account text and 
power, as Foucault would insist, there are differences of emphasis 
between the two and, therefore, in their conceptualisation of cultural 
agency and change.  
If discourse as a power/knowledge regime comes closer to a view  
of culture as text, giving rise to the analytical traditions I reviewed earlier, 
discourse as governmentality comes closer to a view of culture as an 
ensemble of material technologies and practices that seek to promote 
specific modes of being, relating and acting upon oneself and others.  
 
Discourse and Governmentality: Mediation, I wish to argue, needs to be 
understood and analyzed as a technology of governmentality, that is as a 
technology of contemporary rule that does not exercise direct authority on 
people but acts indirectly on the qualities of connectivity and interactivity 
among media publics so as to cultivate certain types of identity and 
agency.  
It is the fact that action in the media is always action at a distance  
that most forcefully thematizes the dimension of mediation as 
governmentality. Because of the practical impossibility to ‘be there’ in 
the de-territorialised space of the media, the forms of engagement that the 
media make available have less to do with immediate, practical action 
and more to do with patterns of identification on the part of media users 
(Barnett 2003:102). This is the case not only with electronic media, such 
as television and its options for identification though its multiple genres 
and narratives, but also with new media, such as blogs and msn spaces, 
where the potential to create a virtual civic society rests precisely on the 
capacity of media users for imaginary identification, deliberation and 
action at a distance (Dahlgren 2000).  
In this sense, we should regard mediation as a process of  
technological meaning production and dissemination which is firmly 
located in the global relations of information technology- both in the 
asymmetrical patterns of global viewing and in the unequal access to new 
media technologies. The question of who watches and who suffers, to 
take an example from Habermas’ and Derrida’s concerns with the ethics 
of mediation, captures a fundamental aspect of this asymmetry, which, 
grounded as it is in differences in economic resources and political 
regimes, becomes refracted and reproduced through mediation in the 
hierarchies of place and human life that divide our worldxiv.  
Through this example, we can see that the definition of mediation  
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as a technology of governmentality capitalizes on the semantic ambiguity 
of the term technology as a materiality that enables not only the process 
of mediation itself, in the technical devices of recording or digitalising 
information, but also the exercise of power, in the re-production of global 
relations of viewing. In its governmental capacity, the example tells us, 
mediation mobilizes regimes of meaning in order to shape the conduct of 
particular media publics in terms of who cares about whom or who acts 
for whose benefit. It therefore begs for an analysis of power that focuses 
specifically on how the media selectively report on human affairs around 
the world and, in so doing, manage to promote (or not) certain cultural 
sensibilities, those of the ‘cosmopolitan philanthropist’ or the ‘global 
citizen’, under conditions of cultural deterritorialisationxv.  
The view of mediation as a technology of governmentality  
is fully compatible with the phronetic spirit. Neither celebrating the 
audiences’ capacity to re-articulate the ‘play of differences’ in media 
texts nor a priori precluding the capacity of the media to engage 
audiences in critical discourse, governmentality conceptualises cultural 
agency as conditional freedom.  
Conditional freedom refers to the function of media texts to  
regulate, but by no means determine, our capacities for engaging with 
other people, by opening up multiple ethical positions for us to identify 
with. This multiple economy of identification is inherently ambivalent. It 
is positive, because we can only relate to others on the condition that we 
are already constituted as free subjects that draw selectively upon an 
existing repertoire of identity resources- those of the philanthropist, the 
activist or simply the voyeur (Boltanski 1999). And it is negative, 
because the systemic ‘bias’ in the possibilities for identification across 
western media ultimately reproduce an exclusively western sensibility 
towards people who are culturally closer to us at the expense of those 
who are not- Derrida’s ‘arrivants’. It is this ambivalence in the economy 
of identification of the media that makes the relationship between media 
text and media users an ethical relationship, par excellence, and a crucial 
stake in the shaping of a cosmopolitan culture today.  
Foucault uses the Aristotelian concept of ‘analytics’, in order to  
distinguish his own study of power as a double economy of freedom and 
subjectification from an abstract ‘theory’ of power. Discourse Analysis, I 
would argue, is a form of an analytics of culture, in so far as it accounts 
for this duality of power; in so far, that is to say, as it describes in detail 
the operations of mediated meanings (or difference within the semiotic), 
so as to show how these meanings engage human beings with specific 
technologies of rule and place them in concrete relationships of power to 
one another (or difference outside the semiotic).  
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The Discourse Analysis of Culture: Multi-modal and Critical perspectives 
I consider the duality of the concept of difference to be a key  
distinction for the methodology of the analytics of mediation in 
contemporary culture. In difference within the semiotic, focus falls on 
each technological medium and its meaning-making affordances, such as 
the telephone and the privileging of the verbal vis-à-vis, say, television 
and the privileging of the image, or interactive media and the privileging 
of a mix of the verbal and the visual. In difference outside the semiotic, 
focus falls on the work of language and image that these technologies 
perform in representing the social world and in formulating proposals of 
moral involvement with the social world- implicitly or explicitly. In 
practice, of course, technological and semiotic mediation are not 
separable, but the distinction helps us draw attention to the moment of 
their articulation,  
say of a camera position and its images, and how such articulation works 
as a technology of power- zooming in on and personalising the other or 
zooming out and keeping a distance from her or him.  
 
Multi-modal Discourse Analysis: Difference within the semiotic refers  
to difference that resides in the very system of language or the image 
(Kress & van Leeuwen 1996; 2001; van Leeuwen and Jewitt 2001 for the 
grammar of the visual; see also van Leeuwen & Jaworski 2002; 
Perlmutter and Wagner 2004; Schroeder 2006). The analysis of mediation 
as difference within the semiotic is multi-modal analysis. Multi-modal 
analysis is not a radical break from the analytical frameworks that I have 
examined, which centre on the analysis of language as the main meaning 
resource. Multi-modal analysis is, rather, an opening of Discourse 
Analysis to the semiotic mode of the image. In recognising that the visual 
is ‘an independently organised and structured message – connected with 
the verbal text, but in no way dependent on it’ (Kress & van Leeuwen 
1996: 17), multi-modal analysis focuses on the ways in which media 
technologies bring image and language together in hybrid texts, on 
various types of screens- from television to the pc or the mobile phone- 
and in various modes of interactivity – from no- to quasi- to full-
interactivity. In so doing, multi-modal analysis draws creatively upon a 
variety of traditions, including aesthetic theory and art history, 
phenomenology of the image, social semiotics and iconographic analysis, 
formulating a distinct and increasingly popular approach to cultural 
analysisxvi.  
The methodological principle of multi-modal analysis is that  
the technologies of mediation construe regimes of meaning, which 
represent the world in various degrees of connectivity to us, media 
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publics. These regimes of meaning in mediation do not coincide with the 
specific image or language we encounter on screen. Because such 
regimes of meaning are patterns of co-appearance and combination rather 
than single pictures or sentences, they are best understood as analytical 
constructs that help us describe the systematic semiotic choices by which 
the world ‘out there’ becomes meaningful to us through specific 
technologies and genres of mediation. Three aspects of media texts are 
relevant in the multi-modal analysis of mediation: the mode of 
presentation through which the media text represents an aspect of the 
social world; the correspondence between verbal narrative and image in 
the text, which creates forms of connectivity and identification for media 
audiences or users; and the overall aesthetic quality or interactive 
potential of the text (Cottle & Rai 2006 for similar proposals on the 
analysis of media texts in terms of their ‘communicative architecture’).  
 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis: Difference outside the semiotic lies in the 
asymmetries of power that traverse the social world and in the historical 
and political relations within or between social groups. The principle of 
difference outside the semiotic is the multi-functionality of semiotic 
practice. Multi-functionality assumes that every semiotic mode, language 
and image, creates meaning that fulfils more than one social function at 
once (Halliday 1985/1995; Halliday and Hasan 1989; Kress 1989; 
Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003; Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999). Whereas 
the first social function of semiosis is the need to name and represent the 
world, the ‘ideational’ function, the second one is the need to engage in 
interaction and relate to other people, the ‘interpersonal’ function of 
semiosis. It is because these two functions concern themselves with the 
implications of semiosis in the social world - with the representation of 
reality and with the orientation to others - that they are conducive to the 
study of social relations of power and bring forth the dimension of 
mediation as difference outside the semiotic (Iedema 2001:191-3).  
The analysis of mediation as difference outside the semiotic is  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)xvii. CDA is an approach to media texts 
that treats the linguistic and visual choices on screen as subtle indicators 
of the power of media technologies to represent the world to us and to 
orient us towards others in this world. Despite this general definition, 
CDA should not be regarded as one single method. As part of  
the broad hermeneutic tradition, CDA is a context-specific and 
historically-sensitive research approach that does not simply provide us 
with a tool-kit of categories for the analysis of power. Depending, rather, 
on the research question and the nature of technological texts under study, 
the critical analysis of mediation may require defining the power of 
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mediation in different ways and combining different categories and 
techniques to examine the link between power and mediated discourse.  
It follows that the categories of representation and orientation may be 
variously operationalised in specific critical analyses of mediation.  
Following on Derrida’s ethical concern with the electronic  
mediation of the ‘arrivant’, CDA would here define the power of 
mediation as the power to classify the world into categories of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ and to orient (or not) the viewers towards those others who are not 
like ‘us’xviii. In the analysis of representations, CDA then would look 
into the construal of the scene of mediated action within a specific space 
and time that separates ‘us’ from ‘them’. The category of ‘spacetime’ 
refers to the place and the temporality of action. It tells us how close a 
specific media event appears to the viewer and how important 
engagement with or even action on the distant ‘other’ is. The analysis of 
‘spacetime’, then, shows us how media technologies not only de-
territorialise our experience of the world but also, simultaneously, how 
they re-territorialise such experience, by regulating the degrees of 
proximity/ distance or urgency/finality for each mediated event. In the 
analysis of orientations, CDA would look into the category of agency. 
Agency is about who acts upon whom in the scene of mediated action. 
There are two dimensions of orientation that are relevant in establishing 
the social relationships of de-territorialised connectivity. First, agency 
refers to who and how active the distant other appears on screen and, 
second, it refers to how other actors present in the scene of action appear 
to engage with one another. These two dimensions of agency come to 
shape how media publics are invited to relate to the mediated event, that 
is if they are  supposed to simply watch, to feel for or to react practically 
to the other’s misfortune or struggle. The analysis of agency, then, shows 
us how the media as technologies of governmentality may re-territorialise 
the distant event not only in terms of proximity or urgency but, 
simultaneously, also in terms of the emotional engagement and moral 
commitment or, perhaps, civil action that they propose to media publics. 
This distinction between representation and orientation, let me repeat, is 
necessary for analytical purposes. In practice, representations and 
orientations are not separate parts of the media text and we must look at 
once into both dimensions in order to determine how they are brought 
together in each media storyxix.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argue that the field of post-structuralist Discourse 
Analysis, a key approach in the study of culture today, is traversed by 
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certain tensions as to what discourse itself is and how it figures in our 
culture today. I demonstrate this point by critically reviewing two 
prototypical theses of Discourse Analysis, Discourse Ethics (Habermas’ 
appropriation of the Frankfurt School’s critical social theory) and 
Deconstruction (Derrida’s textualist appropriation of French post-
structuralism). I claim that this ‘undecidability’ inherent in the field of 
Discourse Analysis is not a bad thing. On the contrary, it can become a 
creative resource for reflexively using Discourse Analysis as a 
methodology for the analysis of contemporary culture- a culture 
characterised by unprecedented processes of intense and pervasive 
mediation.  
I conclude that cultural analysis today could benefit from a  
reflexive Discourse Analysis approach, which i) prioritises questions  
of ethics, under conditions of cultural globalisation and the de-
territorialisation of social relationships and moral commitments;   
ii) grasps the question of ethics from the pragmatic perspective of 
practice and focuses on the instantiation of ethical values in the texts of 
mediation (phronesis); and iii) effectively combines the interest in the 
production of hybrid media texts (multi-modal analysis) with the interest 
in power both as hegemony and as governmentality.  
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i Truth isn’t outside power…it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint. And it induces regular effects of power Foucault (1980:131);  
see also Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982, ch. 4); Barrett (1991: 126-137); Howarth 
(2000:67-85); Chouliaraki (2002: 83-114). 
 
ii Hanssen (2000: 14) for the argument that ‘the between’ is not a position of 
inconclusive suspension or impass but rather a position that both exposes the 
fundamental differences between post-structuralism and Critical theory and 
acknowledges the terms on which they may converge.  
 
iii J.L. Austin ('How to Do Things with Words', 1962) and J. Searle ('Speech Act 
Theory' 1969) for Speech Act Theory, the study of meaning-making and its effects on 
human action. The theory is based upon the idea that linguistic conventions do not 
only determine how the world is represented in language (the propositional content of 
utterances), but also how things get to be accomplished in speech (the 'illocutionary 
force' of our speech acts) - what Habermas (1971) calls the 'performative-
propositional dual structure' of meaning. Habermas’ ‘Universal Pragmatics’, which, 
as we shall see, informs his Discourse Ethics, is based precisely on language as acts 
oriented towards pragmatic objectives. 
       
iv Schutz's sociological phenomenology does no aspire to explicate a priori rules that 
constitute the empirical world, as Husserl’s philosophical phenomenology does, but to 
describe the concrete ways in which social actors constitute common understandings 
of their social situations in the contexts of their everyday life (Giddens 1992:32; 
Eagleton 1991:56).  
 
v  Even though Gadamer did not specify one concrete methodological route for 
hermeneutic inquiry, the concept of text interpretation is central in all contemporary 
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qualitative research. Embedded in broader designs of anthropological fieldwork, 
including participant observation, interviews, diaries or archive search, the text is 
today at the centre of the hermeneutic analysis of culture (Eagleton 1991). 
 
vi Apart from Habermas’ argument, which I explore in detail below, the ‘hermeneutics 
of suspicion’ also came as a response to Gadamer’s idealism in that it perceived 
understanding not only as a positive move towards partial, yet illuminating truths, but 
as a violent move that seeks to expose deeper truths purposefully hidden (Ricoeur 
1970).  Freudianism and Marxism are seen, in Ricoeur, as different forms of 
hermeneutics of suspicion, whereby the aim has been to understand reality in order to 
‘demystify’ it, in order to disclose an order of things that the self-deluded social 
subject is unable to perceive.      
 
vii Notably Raymond Williams (1981, 1982, 1989); also Hall (1987, 1994); Gitlin 
(1994); (Fairclough 1992). For criticisms see Laclau & Mouffe (1985); Barrett (1991: 
51-80); Bennett (1992: 23-34).  
 
viii Habermas (1989) for the thesis on the ‘structural transformation of the public 
sphere’, but also Habermas (1998) on ‘facts and norms’; Barnett (2003: 57-60); 
McLaughlin (2004: 157-9) for critical discussions 
 
ix For Derrida’s conception of culture see Derrida (2002); for a critical discussion of 
Derrida’s deconstruction and post-modern culture see Harvey (1989/1991: 39-65); for 
Derrida’s approach to culture, public life and the ethics of the ‘other’ see particularly 
Barnett (2003: 9-32 and 54-80).  
 
x For the relative neglect of questions of ethics in Cultural Studies in favour of a 
politics of representation see Kellner (1999). 
 
xi More recently, Habermas’ reluctant openness toward the media is based on the 
recognition that they create interconnectedness among publics and contribute to 
articulating and evaluating public discourse Habermas (2006: 9-10); see also Barnett 
(2003: 71-5) 
 
xii The most radical version of pessimism on the role of the media in our culture is 
Baudrillard’s thesis, where the media are considered to be responsible for the 
disappearance of the real into a simulacrum - a mirror image of reality that is 
nowadays the only authentic reality of the spectator. This position combines an 
extreme version of Derrida’s iterablity (signs are here disconnected from any 
reference external to the medium itself) with the pessimism of Habermas vis a vis the 
corroding role of media in our culture,  and, as a consequence, entails a disabling 
nihilism- a nihilism, which leaves no space for the ethical content of mediation (for a 
criticism directly related to this, Chouliaraki 2006: 50-3).  
 
xiii Aristotle, Nichomahean Ethics 1140a24-1140b12 and 1144b33-1145a11. Also 
Flyvebjerg for the use of Aristotle in the social sciences (2001:110-28) and Ross 
(1923/1995:31-49) for Aristotle’s indictive methods and his analytics.   
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xiv Hall (1996:1-17; 1997: 223-290) on the concept of difference and ’other’; Calhoun 
(1995: 231-82) on difference and national identity; Peters (1999); Silverstone (1999; 
2006) and Butler (2004) in relation to media and the ‘other’.  
xv Couldry (2005) for an overview of Discourse approaches to the question of social 
action and media texts; also for a persuasive argument for expanding the scope of 
Discourse approaches beyond media texts towards, broadly, texts about the media by 
audiences and media users as part and parcel of the contexts of mediation today.  
 
xvi For the increasing interest in visual analysis in cultural studies see Mirzoeff (1999); 
Evans & Hall (1999); Emmison & Smith (2000); Sturken & Cartwright (2001); van 
Leeuwen and Jewitt (2001); Iedema (2001) among others. 
 
xvii Inspired by the multi-functional theory of language (see below) and by the 
Russian school of linguistics and literary criticism, with figures such as 
Voloshinov and Bakhtin, CDA combines the close analysis of linguistic text 
with a Gramscian view of discourse as a key dimension of hegemonic struggles, 
showing how meaning and power articulate in a range of public discourses, such 
as political and media discourse (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995, 2003). 
Moreover, Mediated Discourse Analysis operates with a broad view of 
mediation and provides critical contributions on the ways in which, specifically, 
discourse and technology shape everyday actions and dispositions in our culture 
today (Scollon 1998; Scollon & Scollon 2003; Levine and Scollon 2004). 
 
xviii I discuss this categorisation in detail in Chouliaraki (2006: 84-93). 
 
xix Other versions of Critical Discourse Analysis, such as the historical approach 
towards political discourse (Wodak 1999; 2003; Chilton 2003) as well as the 
cognitive approach to discourse (van Dijk eg 1997a,b), do not directly draw upon the 
multi-functionality principle of discourse but sustain the interest in language and 
power, contributing to an analysis of culture from the perspectives of domination and 
social inequalities.     
 
 37
